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Adjustment in Good Times and During the Crisis 
 





Using a large panel of Czech manufacturing firms with 50 or more employees, we update 
the firm-level labour demand elasticity estimates for 2002–2009. The economic crisis of 
2008–2009 provides a source of variation needed for getting estimates that cover not only 
times of growth, but also a period of economic contraction. We find that in normal times 
(until 2007), the short-term elasticity is -0.53 with respect to wages and 0.43 with respect 
to sales, while the long-term elasticities are close to or below unity, standing at -0.94 for 
wages and 0.76 for sales. Both the wage and sales elasticities increased during the crisis, 
suggesting that firms became demand constrained, but only the sales elasticity is 
significantly different. The long-term wage elasticity close to -1 in the period before and 
during the crisis suggests that firms’ employment decisions are made within fixed 
budgets. Finally, we find that the inclusion of workers hired through temporary work 
agencies does not significantly affect the results, indicating that firms take into account 
total labour when deciding on employment and that hired workers are used as an equal 
labour demand channel with lower adjustment costs. As a robustness check, our results 
are qualitatively comparable with the narrative evidence from an ad-hoc firm-level survey 
on wage and price formation conducted in 2007 and 2009 within the ESCB Wage 
Dynamics Network.  
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Nontechnical Summary 
The sensitivity of employment to changes in real wages and sales – so called labour demand 
elasticity – is one of the key parameters used in macroeconomic models for policy making. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the latest estimates of labour demand elasticities for the Czech Republic 
on the firm level are only available for the pre-1993 period. Clearly there are reasons to believe 
that the Czech labour market and firm behaviour has changed substantially since these early 
stages of economic transition. The last almost two decades have been marked by a number of 
important events – massive inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) during the 1990s and 
2000s, the Czech Republic’s entry into the European Union in 2004, and the global crisis of 
2008/2009, to name but a few.  
This paper fills the gap in the literature by presenting firm-level labour demand elasticities in the 
Czech Republic using a large panel of manufacturing firms with 50 or more employees from 2000 
to 2009. Apart from bringing updated evidence on one particular country, the global crisis of 
2008/2009 allows us to test a fundamental question: how different are labour demand elasticities 
in normal and crisis times? 
Compared to the early transition results presented in Basu et al. (2005), we find the estimated real 
wage and sales elasticities of employment to be of a similar size. In normal times (2002–2007), 
the short-term elasticity is -0.53 with respect to wages and 0.43 with respect to sales. The long-
term elasticities are close to or below unity, standing at -0.94 for wages and 0.76 for sales. We 
find that during the crisis both the wage and sales elasticities increased, but only in the case of 
sales elasticity is the difference significant. The higher elasticity during the crisis reflects the fact 
that firms became demand constrained. The long-term wage elasticity is close to -1 in the period 
before and during the crisis, indicating that employment decisions are made by firms within fixed 
budgets. 
We find that employment decisions in firms are the same regardless of whether workers hired 
through temporary work agencies are included, suggesting that firms take into account total 
employment when deciding on labour used in production. However, the dismissal of hired 
workers is faster than that of own employees, as third-party hired workers are less costly to 
dismiss (there are no severance payments). 
Finally, as a robustness check, our results are in line with the stylised facts obtained from an ad-
hoc survey among Czech firms conducted in 2007 and 2009 within the framework of the ESCB 
Wage Dynamics Network. Indeed, the survey documented that (base) wages remained largely 
rigid during the economic contraction and firms extensively used other available adjustment 
strategies when faced with a fall in aggregate demand, for example reductions in output and prices 
(and, as a consequence, sales).  
 
 





Understanding the link between firm-level production and labour demand is crucial for calibrating 
the macroeconomic models used for forecasting employment and unemployment. The recent 
situation on Czech firms’ demand side is surprisingly unexplored. While the analysis of 
unemployment and the process of unemployment-vacancy matching has received quite substantial 
coverage in the literature – see, among others, Munich et al. (1999) on worker-firm matching, 
Jurajda and Munich (2003) on long-term unemployment, and Galuščák and Munich (2007) on 
structural and cyclical unemployment – all these studies focus primarily on human beings and do 
not explore individual firm behaviour and firm-level data per se.  
The Czech Republic had one of the lowest unemployment rates during the early stages of 
economic transition in the first half of the 1990s. Surprisingly, the most recent information we 
have on firm-level labour demand elasticity also dates from the first half of the 1990s (Basu et al., 
2005).
1 In particular, their estimates cover the period 1990–1993, and the short-term demand 
elasticity with respect to sales (at the end of their period, in 1993) is 0.5 while the long-term one is 
0.9. The short-term employment elasticity with respect to wages is -0.6, but the long-term 
elasticity is insignificant (at -0.5).
2 
Other studies employing firm-level data (such as Baghdasarian et al., 2001, and Lizal and Svejnar, 
2002) focus on investment and the adjustment cost function and their data span does not go 
beyond 1998 anyway. Undoubtedly, the Czech labour market and firm behaviour have changed 
substantially since the early stages of economic transition, for example due to large FDI inflows 
and entry into the European Union, and we need to know what the current link between 
production and labour demand is. 
If we examine labour demand on the firm level, labour demand may naturally differ across 
particular groups of firms as well as workers. Oversimplifying, all factors which affect the 
performance of firms and workers may affect the demand for labour, too. The meta survey by 
Estrin et al. (2009) covers virtually all studies that have attempted to estimate the effect of 
privatisation and changes in ownership on the performance of firms. Recently, economic analyses 
have focused on the effects of different ownership structures on standard measures of corporate 
(mainly financial) performance. The demand for labour may also be skill-specific due to technical 
change and the possibility of labour-capital substitution. In particular, skill-biased technology 
change increases the relative demand for skilled labour (Acemoglu, 2002). This may also be 
relevant in the Czech Republic, as fast technical change and increased exposure to foreign 
competition due to EU membership have increased the weight of high-skilled products in exports. 
For example, Tarjáni (2007) investigated relative labour demand in Hungary. In this respect, the 
main contributions of our study are rather modest. We primarily focus on presenting updated 
labour demand elasticities for the Czech Republic in 2002–2009 using firm-level data for 2000–
2009. Second, we test how different the estimated labour demand elasticities are in ‘good times’ 
(2002–2007) versus the crisis period (2008–2009). 
                                                           
1 Labour demand elasticities are estimated in Onaran (2008) using aggregate manufacturing data for the Czech 
Republic and several other Central and Eastern European countries in 1999–2004. 
2 Micevska (2008) reports similar elasticity estimates using firm-level data in Macedonia over 1994–1999.   4  Jan Babecký, Kamil Galuščák and Lubomír Lízal     
 
   
Indeed, the economic and financial crisis of 2008/2009 provides a source of variation making it 
possible to get labour demand estimates not only at times of growth, but also during an economic 
contraction. Do firms change their behaviour during times of crisis? Are short term ‘expansion’ 
elasticities different from ‘crisis’ ones? A fall in aggregate demand is one of the manifestations of 
the 2008/2009 crisis. Are firms really demand constrained as well? Do we have losers only? In 
other words, did some firms benefit from the global crisis? The extension of the sample from 
2000 to 2009 allows us to answer such fundamental questions.  
Finally, our results, and in particular the impact of the 2008/2009 crisis on labour demand, are 
assessed against an ad-hoc survey conducted at the firm level in the Czech Republic in 2007 and 
2009 within the ESCB Wage Dynamics Network.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 discusses 
methodological aspects of estimating labour demand. Section 3 describes the data and illustrates 
some stylised facts. Section 4 presents the labour demand elasticity estimation results. Section 5 
compares these results with the findings of the 2007 and 2009 waves of the ad-hoc survey of firms 
conducted within the Wage Dynamics Network. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
The standard labour demand function based on cost minimisation (Hamermesh, 1993) can be 
written as 
                                                                L = L (W, Q, X),           (1) 
where L is the labour demand function, W stands for the real wage, Q is production (or sales) and 
X are other relevant control factors. This specification is used for the labour demand function of a 
firm that faces a given level of output. As the period we will cover is characterised by open 
markets and competition, the exogenously given demand assumption is likely to hold, but we also 
test for possible endogeneity of Q. If the wage is also exogenously determined, OLS estimation of 
the operationalised equation (1) gives consistent estimates. However, wage determination is more 
likely to be endogenously determined, affected by legal form or trade union influence (Prasnikar 
et al., 1994). Therefore, our estimation method needs to account for this possibility using the 
instrumental variable or GMM technique. 
Basu at al. (2005) use the following general form of the operationalised equation (1): 
    ln Lit = α0i + α1ln Lit-1 + β1ln Qit + β2ln Qit-1 + γ1ln Wit + γ2ln Wit-1 + δ1Xit + δ2Xit-1 + εit. (2) 
Subscript i is the firm index and t is the time index. L denotes labour employed, Q stands for real 
output or sales (for example, Micevska, 2008, uses value added per worker instead), W is the real 
wage and X are other control variables that are deemed relevant for firms’ labour demand and that 
can also exhibit a lag structure. The short-term elasticity of employment with respect to real 
output (sales) is given by coefficient β1. Coefficient γ1 characterises the short-term employment 




the variables do not change from one period to another, in which case equation (2) becomes a 
static one:  
             (1 – α1) ln Lit = α0i + (β1 + β2) ln Qit + (γ1 + γ2) ln Wit + (δ1 + δ2) Xit + εit.   (2') 
Then the long-term sales (output) elasticity is given by (β1 + β2)/(1 – α1) and the long-term real 
wage elasticity is defined as (γ1 + γ2)/(1 – α1). 
The general specification (2) can be reduced to one of three particular cases: (i) a partial 
adjustment model; (ii) a static model; or (iii) a first difference model. In the case of the partial 
adjustment model, the coefficient α1 on the lagged dependent variable in (2) is not zero, other 
explanatory variables being static (β2 = γ2 = δ2 = 0). For the static (complete adjustment) model, 
there are no lagged explanatory variables at all (α1 = β2 = γ2 = δ2 = 0). Finally, equation (2) 
transforms into the first difference model if α1 = 1, β2 = -β1, γ2 = -γ1, δ2 = -δ1. Which of the three 
forms is more appropriate depends on the data. Basu et al. (2005) report that usually any of these 
three sets of restrictions were rejected, thus the general form (2) was estimated.  
The estimation method needs to account for the potential inconsistency of fixed-effect dynamic 
panels (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The econometric approach calls for the use of the instrumental 
variable or GMM techniques, where lagged levels and differences can serve as potential 
instruments (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 2000). The particular choice of 
instruments employed (i.e. the orthogonality conditions used) depends also on the nature of the 
error process, and the validity of the instruments (i.e. the assumptions that allow the use of more 
powerful instruments) should be tested using appropriate Hausman-type tests (Matyas and 
Sevestre, 2008; Wooldridge, 2002).  
As instruments, Basu et al. (2005) use industry dummy variables, district dummy variables, 
ownership, the preceding year value of firm assets interacted with industry dummy variables, the 
current and lagged average values of sales, wages and employment of firms in the neighbouring 
three-digit industry, and the average value of the lagged assets of firms in the neighbouring three-
digit industry. The neighbouring three-digit industry is defined as the next three-digit industry 
with respect to the industry the firm belongs to, within the same two-digit industry. For the last 
three-digit industry within the two-digit industry, the most similar three-digit industry is chosen.  
Our empirical specification takes the following form of a first difference model, removing the 
firm-specific fixed effects: 
      ∆ln Lit = α ∆ln Lit-1 + β ∆ln Qit + γ ∆ln Wit + ∑δj indjt + ∆εit,                          (3) 
where L is the number of workers (either own workers only, or the total number of workers 
including those hired through temporary work agencies), Q are real sales (deflated using the 
producer price index in manufacturing, PPI), W is the real wage (obtained as the total firm-level 
wage bill divided by the number of workers and deflated by the consumer price index, CPI), indj 
are industry dummies and εit is the error term, which is assumed to be white noise. All variables 
(employment, sales, wages, CPI, PPI) are yearly averages. Notice that we use sales instead of 
output, for two main reasons. First, sales better reflect firms’ activity (ability to sell products) than 
production, especially at a time of crisis, since a decrease in demand could cause some part of 
production to go to stocks. Second, sales are a directly measurable variable, while output needs to   6  Jan Babecký, Kamil Galuščák and Lubomír Lízal     
 
   
be calculated using additional information such as changes in stocks, which makes sales less 
subject to measurement errors. Next, while real sales are obtained using the PPI deflator, which 
reflects firms’ costs, real wages are constructed using the CPI, since this index better reflects the 
process of wage setting. Indeed, in accordance with the bargaining framework, wages are set 
endogenously as an outcome of negotiations between firms and workers, where unions play a role. 
In such a three-party wage negotiation process, which typically occurs in yearly cycles, the price 
index that is commonly used by workers/unions to form expectations about future inflation is the 
CPI.  
We estimate equation (3) using IV estimation in the period 2002–2009 and report both the short-
term and long-term elasticities of labour demand with respect to real wages and real sales. 
Although the data are available since 2000, we lose two years of observations due the inclusion of 
dynamics in equation (3) and the presence of differenced terms. Thus, the estimates are available 
since 2002. However, for several periods of time we also commonly lack data for some firms, 
owing, for example, to firm entry, break-up and exit, and therefore the set of firms on which the 
estimation is exercised is somewhat smaller than the full set. Hence, we face a trade-off between 
having a balanced panel and trying to maximise the number of observations available. The effect 
of missing observations in the balanced panel could be mitigated by estimating equation (3) using 
sub-periods. Such an approach was followed by Basu et al. (2005), who estimate their model for 
consecutive two-year panels. In fact, this was the only feasible solution for estimating labour 
demand on the pre-transition and earlier transition data, since firm turnover was substantial 
because of the restructuring process. In order to illustrate the variation of the estimated 
coefficients over time, we also report estimates from consecutive short panels: for each year in 
2002–2009, observations from the current and two previous years are used to produce estimations 
for a given year. As another alternative, we also report estimates from consecutive short panels 
based on the balanced dataset. When interpreting estimations on the balanced data, one should 
keep in mind that such estimations are conditional on firms’ survival.  
We use the same set of instruments as Basu et al. (2005) for wages, sales and lagged labour. In 
particular, district dummy variables capture differences in district-level employment. The 
preceding year value of firm assets interacted with industry dummy variables is used as an 
instrument, as capital is quasi-fixed and determined before employment is chosen by the firm in 
the current year. The current and lagged average values of sales, wages and employment of firms 
in the neighbouring three-digit industry proxy for the economic situation within the industry. The 
average value of the lagged assets of firms in the neighbouring three-digit industry controls for 
investment opportunities during the business cycle. Finally, a dummy variable for foreign 
ownership and industry dummy variables are also used as instruments. In contrast to Basu et al. 
(2005), we also use the Herfindahl index of market concentration as another instrument in the 
pooled sample estimation to capture changes in market concentration within industries over time.
3 
We use the Hausman test for testing whether real sales are exogenous, while we also test for 
overidentifying restrictions (see Wooldridge, 2002). We assume that wages are endogenous due to 
prevailing bargaining structures (see above). Finally, we also instrument lagged labour because 
the error term in (3) contains εit-1 and is thus correlated with lagged labour.  
                                                           




In what follows, we estimate the firm-level elasticities of labour demand, addressing the role of 
firm size and type of industry. In addition, the recent economic slowdown provides an additional 
benefit as a source of substantial variation needed for getting estimates of labour demand 
elasticities that cover not only times of growth, but also a period of economic contraction. Before 
presenting the estimates, we thus investigate how firms adjust their demand for labour and labour 
costs due to the 2008/2009 financial and economic crisis.  
 
3. Data Description and Stylised Facts 
To provide background for the interpretation of our results, Table 1 illustrates key Czech 
macroeconomic indicators for the period 2002–2009. The growth of the economy slowed at the 
beginning of the period, as documented by low GDP growth in 2002 and by a drop or low growth 
in real value added and real sales in manufacturing in 2003. In subsequent years – until 2007 – the 
economy accelerated. There followed a slowdown in 2008 and a massive drop in output growth in 
2009. A similar cyclical pattern was observed in the number of employees, while the 
unemployment rate peaked in 2004 and declined until 2008. The average real wage in the total 
economy as well as in manufacturing exhibited relatively stable growth over the sample period 
and decelerated sharply in 2008 and 2009 due to the crisis. Overall, the indicators shown in Table 
1 illustrate the profound impact of the crisis on the economy and on manufacturing industry in 
particular. 
Table 1: Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 2002–2009 
   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP (at constant prices)  1.9  3.6 4.5 6.3 6.8 6.1 2.5 -4.1 
Value added in manufacturing 
(at constant prices)  5.4 -1.0  13.2  11.9  14.6 9.2 7.8  -11.9 
Real sales in manufacturing  4.1  1.9 11.9 3.0  8.6 10.3 -5.2  -11.6 
Real  wage            
  - total  5.9  5.7  3.5  3.0  4.0  4.3  1.4  2.2 
  - manufacturing  4.5  5.0  4.8 2.7 3.9 4.4 2.1 0.8 
Number  of  employees            
  - total  -0.3  -2.6  0.8  1.8  1.9  2.9  1.3  -2.0 
  - manufacturing  -1.3  -4.4  1.1  1.9  2.5  2.4  1.0  -6.6 
Unemployment rate  7.3  7.8 8.3 7.9 7.1 5.3 4.4 6.7 
Note:   Year-on-year changes in %, average ILO unemployment rate in %. Sales in manufacturing deflated 
using the producer price index in manufacturing. Average wage deflated using the consumer price 
index. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Czech Statistical Office data. 
 
For the purpose of the estimation we use a large panel of all manufacturing firms with 50 or more 
employees in 2000–2009 containing yearly balance sheet data and income statement information 
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and wages of own employees, we complement the dataset with firm-level information on workers 
hired through temporary work agencies.
4 
The sample covers economically active firms with non-zero employment, wages and sales in a 
given year. Nominal wages per employee are deflated using the consumer price index. Sales are 
deflated using the producer price index in manufacturing. Summary statistics for the key variables 
– the number of workers (own workers as well as own plus hired workers), real wages and real 
sales – are illustrated in Table 2. The number of observations per year varies between 1,277 and 
2,095. Data on the number of hired workers are available since 2005 only.  
 
 
Table 2: Sample Summary Statistics, 2002–2009 
  2002 2003 
  N Mean  Std. Dev.  N Mean  Std. Dev. 
Log own workers  1660  290  391  1816 268 371 
Log own+hired workers  0      0    
Log real wage  1660  183  60  1816 192 64 
Log real sales  1660  552636  1569111  1816 573676 1743342 
  2004 2005 
  N Mean  Std. Dev.  N Mean  Std. Dev. 
Log own workers  2095  250  372  1558 316  674 
Log own+hired workers  0      1558 328  765 
Log real wage  2095  202  68  1558 208  66 
Log real sales  2095  569220  1736611  1558 852046  4881905 
  2006 2007 
  N Mean  Std. Dev.  N Mean  Std. Dev. 
Log own workers  1433  328  408  1356 339  414 
Log own+hired workers  1433  342  439  1356 358  459 
Log real wage  1433  216  67  1356 228  71 
Log real sales  1433  937740  3482000  1356 1012136  3614259 
  2008 2009 
  N Mean  Std. Dev.  N Mean  Std. Dev. 
Log own workers  1277  346  431  1329 287  343 
Log own+hired workers  1277  364  472  1329 297  362 
Log real wage  1277  234  73  1329 237  82 
Log real sales  1277  1011833  3838901  1329 826729  2577523 
Notes:   Average real wage and real sales per year in CZK thousands. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Czech Statistical Office data. 
 
 
                                                           
4 In 2008 and 2009, the numbers of hired workers are yearly averages from quarterly datasets covering all 
manufacturing firms with 50 or more employees. In 2005–2007, the yearly averages are from monthly data 
covering all firms in manufacturing with 100 or more employees and all systemically important firms with 50–




Table 3 shows the breakdown of the number of firms and employees by the type of manufacturing 
industry, also differentiating between own and hired workers. In total, we distinguish 11 industry 
groups based on the two-digit level of the NACE classification. Several facts emerge from Table 
3. First, the number of hired employees represents only a small fraction of total employment. 
Second, there is a clear decline in employment in 2008 and 2009, the period of economic 
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Table 3: Number of Firms and Employment in Manufacturing Industries, 2002–2009  
NACE codes    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
15-16  Food products, beverages and tobacco products 
  N  255 279 281 187 208 197 168 177
  Own  empl.  62597 67520 63752 54157 60297 56388 46465 47333
 Hired  empl.  0  0 0 849 1397 2167  1496 1300
 All  empl.  0  0 0 55006 61694 58555  47961 48633
17-19  Textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
  N 195  219 215 111 88 78  66 64
  Own  empl.  64199 58433 50498 30363 26268 23712 19638 14978
  Hired empl.  0  0 0 151 119 144  72 18
  All empl.  0  0 0 30514 26387 23856  19710 14996
20-22  Wood, pulp and paper, publishing and printing 
  N 92  112 134 136 110 94  85 86
  Own  empl.  18940 21066 22593 23493 21345 19144 17831 16957
  Hired empl.  0  0 0 536 305 550  304 140
  All empl.  0  0 0 24029 21650 19694  18135 17097
23-24  Chemicals and oil processing 
  N  72 73 77 59 50 42 45 44
  Own  empl.  17309 18225 16902 17807 17020 16154 16609 12872
  Hired empl.  0  0 0 65 132 202  513 401
  All empl.  0  0 0 17872 17152 16356  17122 13273
25  Rubber and plastic products 
  N 86  108 125 97 94 85  99 112
  Own  empl.  19497 20766 22474 22011 24007 22420 27324 25133
  Hired empl.  0  0 0 596 667 892  1299 911
  All empl.  0  0 0 22607 24674 23312  28623 26044
26  Other non-metallic mineral products 
  N 92  100 174 93 80 80  85 88
  Own  empl.  26687 23238 49490 23743 24166 23506 23409 21244
  Hired empl.  0  0 0 309 294 299  298 282
  All empl.  0  0 0 24052 24460 23805  23707 21526
27-28 Metals 
  N  304 293 334 221 207 210 193 210
  Own  empl.  77642 70140 73089 64479 57632 60786 62487 50378
  Hired empl.  0  0 0 3231 3204 4421  3252 1398
  All empl.  0  0 0 67710 60836 65207  65739 51776
29  Machinery and other equipment 
  N  214 246 306 231 211 201 202 207
  Own  empl.  62653 64162 71725 68070 69208 68142 63956 57049
  Hired empl.  0  0 0 2127 2797 4285  3851 1614
  All empl.  0  0 0 70197 72005 72427  67807 58663
30-33  Electrical and optical machinery and equipment 
  N  184 202 237 201 183 169 157 161
  Own  empl.  62776 69339 78244 77989 77573 74277 74337 60320
  Hired empl.  0  0 0 4735 6002 6748  6652 2788









Table 3: Number of Firms and Employment in Manufacturing Industries, 2002–2009         
(continued) 
NACE codes    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
34-35  Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 
  N  123 138 145 173 166 164 142 143
  Own  empl.  57910 62538 64116 97809 81995 85845 80165 66612
  Hired empl.  0  0 0 7100 4389 5838  5143 3455
  All empl.  0  0 0 104909 86384 91683  85308 70067
36-37  Furniture, other manufacturing, recycling 
  N  43 46 67 49 36 36 35 37
 Own  empl.  11560  10928 11557 11847 10574 9718  9894 8915
 Hired  empl.  0  0 0 296 583 185  459 267
 All  empl.  0  0 0 12143 11157 9903  10353 9182
Total  N  1660 1816 2095 1558 1433 1356 1277 1329
  Own  empl.  481770 486355 524440 491768 470085 460092 442115 381791
 Hired  empl.  0  0 0 19992 19888 25730  23337 12574
 All  empl.  0  0 0 511760 489974 485822  465452 394365
Note:  Employment as number of persons – own employees, hired employees, all employees. 





While Table 3 presents the numbers of employees, Table 4 illustrates the sample employment 
changes in percentages, by the same 11 industry groups. As indicated by the last three rows, the 
period of 2008–2009 is characterised by an overall decline in employment of 0.9% in 2008 and 
15.1% in 2009. Hired employees were hit even harder; their decline in employment was 2.1% in 
2008 and a dramatic 46.3% in 2009. Notice that the number of hired employees was also growing 
much faster than that of own employees in the period before the crisis, in 2006 and 2007 (24%–
30% versus 0.5%–1.2%). Next, as indicated in Table 4, there is large variation in employment 
dynamics across industries, in particular during the crisis. For example, the number of hired 
employees increased by as much as 150% in 2008 in Furniture, other manufacturing, recycling 
(NACE 36–37), while declining by 36% in the same industry in 2009. In Metals (NACE 27–28), 








                                                           
5 The employment changes reported in Table 4 are based on the full sample, so the firms are not necessarily the 
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Table 4: Change in Employment by Manufacturing Industries, 2002–2009 
NACE codes  Empl.  type  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
15-16  Food products, beverages and tobacco products 
  Own  empl. 0.0 -0.2 -3.1 -2.4 -4.4 -0.7 -1.7 -2.6 
  Hired  empl.       6.3  23.3  -4.6  -18.0 
  All  empl.      -4.2  0.0  -1.8  -3.1 
17-19  Textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
  Own  empl. -7.7  -10.3  -7.5 -4.5 -5.4 -2.7 -8.6  -14.8 
  Hired  empl.       -22.1  15.8  -5.9  27.3 
  All  empl.      -5.4  -2.6  -8.6  -14.8 
20-22  Wood, pulp and paper, publishing and printing 
  Own  empl.  -0.6  -1.5 0.4 0.9 2.0 1.1 -2.5  -11.5 
  Hired  empl.       -7.6  16.5  -25.4  -38.8 
  All  empl.      1.9  1.4  -3.0  -11.8 
23-24  Chemicals and oil processing 
  Own  empl.  -2.1 7.8 -4.0 0.8 0.5 0.7 -2.3 -6.5 
  Hired  empl.       46.3  103.3  15.0  -35.6 
  All  empl.      0.8  1.3  -1.9  -7.8 
25  Rubber and plastic products 
  Own  empl.  3.2 0.6 4.8 4.5 5.5 2.2 -0.9  -12.6 
  Hired  empl.       9.5  63.2  24.3  -28.7 
  All  empl.      5.6  3.6  0.0  -13.3 
26  Other non-metallic mineral products 
  Own  empl. -2.4 -2.1 -1.8 0.2 -4.0 -3.7 0.1 -11.0 
  Hired  empl.       11.5  10.6  -1.6  -17.8 
  All  empl.      -3.8  -3.6  0.0  -11.1 
27-28 Metals 
  Own  empl.  -2.9 -3.7 1.0 0.8 -0.7 1.2 1.1  -17.2 
  Hired  empl.       15.4  31.4  -17.4  -52.9 
  All  empl.      0.1  2.8  0.0  -18.9 
29  Machinery and other equipment 
  Own  empl. -4.2 -7.6 -0.6 1.6  1.8  1.6 -1.6  -14.9 
  Hired  empl.       11.7  57.0  -7.2  -61.6 
  All  empl.      2.1  3.8  -1.9  -17.7 
30-33  Electrical and optical machinery and equipment 
  Own  empl.  -3.3 1.1 7.1 0.8 3.8 3.8 0.7  -19.1 
  Hired  empl.       46.4  24.1  11.3  -59.9 
  All  empl.      6.0  5.2  1.5  -22.6 
34-35  Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 
  Own  empl.  4.9 0.6 2.3 4.1 3.3 3.7 -0.4  -13.4 
  Hired  empl.       21.6  30.3  -10.7  -28.3 
  All  empl.      4.1  5.1  -1.1  -14.2 
36-37  Furniture, other manufacturing, recycling 
  Own  empl. -6.3 -7.6 -4.4 -0.2 -2.3 -6.8 1.6 -11.1 
  Hired  empl.       77.9  -68.8  149.0  -35.9 
  All  empl.      0.1  -10.1  4.3  -12.0 
Total  Own  empl.  -2.3  -2.8 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.2 -0.8  -13.5 
  Hired  empl.       23.7  29.5  -2.1  -46.3 
  All  empl.      1.3  2.4  -0.9  -15.1 
Note:    Average industry-level employment changes for firms observed in the sample in a given year.             
Year-on-year changes in %. 




4. Estimation Results 
Table 5 presents the labour demand estimates for 2002–2009. In column 1 we show the estimates 
of equation (3), where the dependent variable refers to own employees in the firm. In the overall 
sample period, the short-run elasticities of wages and sales are -0.60 and 0.55 respectively, while 
the long-run elasticities are -0.92 and 0.84. In the next two columns we show the estimates of the 
first-difference static model (column 2) and the first-difference dynamic model, where lagged 
wages and lagged sales are included (column 3). Based on this comparison, column 1 is our 
preferred model for the overall sample, as the lagged labour coefficient estimate is significant and 
the estimates of lagged wages and lagged sales are not significant in column 3. 
We see that the elasticities do not differ significantly by firm size (column 4). During the 
2008/2009 crisis, the short-term employment elasticity with respect to sales is significantly higher 
than during the pre-crisis period until 2007, but the employment elasticity with respect to wages is 
not statistically different (column 5). While the demand elasticities are not affected by firm size in 
the period covering both normal and crisis times (column 4), during the crisis the employment 
elasticity with respect to sales is higher for firms with 100–249 employees (firms with 250 or 
more employees being the reference group, see column 6). This suggests that manufacturing firms 
are more demand constrained during the crisis and that firms with 100–249 employees are hit 
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Table 5: Labour Demand Estimates, 2002–2009 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆Log labour (-1)  0.3419***    0.5074***  0.3460***  0.4319***  0.3806*** 
  [0.0641]    [0.1199] [0.0649] [0.0809] [0.0671] 
∆Log wage  -0.6028*** -0.7275*** -0.7642*** -0.5982*** -0.5316***  -0.5418***
  [0.0908] [0.0853] [0.2076] [0.1186] [0.1071] [0.1011] 
∆Log  sales  0.5544*** 0.6540*** 0.5880*** 0.4982*** 0.4328*** 0.5052*** 
  [0.0425] [0.0380] [0.0515] [0.0960] [0.0732] [0.0505] 
∆Log  wage(-1)     0.4003     
     [0.2448]     
∆Log  sales(-1)     -0.1547     
     [0.1027]     
∆Log  wage*size(50-99)      -0.0052    
      [0.1324]    
∆Log  wage*size(100-249)      -0.0021    
      [0.1064]    
∆Log  sales*size(50-99)      -0.1052    
      [0.1522]    
∆Log  sales*size(100-249)      0.1466    
      [0.1282]    
∆Log  wage*period08/09       -0.3694   
       [0.3240]   
∆Log  sale*period08/09       0.2308**   
       [0.0946]   
∆Log wage* 
period08/09*size(50-99)        -0.1093 
        [0.6835] 
∆Log wage* 
period08/09*size(100-249)        -0.455 
        [0.4627] 
∆Log sales* 
period08/09*size(50-99)        0.0888 
        [0.2024] 
∆Log sales* 
period08/09*size(100-249)        0.2346*** 
        [0.0815] 
N  12524 12524 12524 12524 12524 12524 
Long-run wage elasticity  -0.916***    -0.739*** -0.915*** -0.936*** -0.875*** 
Long-run sales elasticity  0.843***    0.880*** 0.762*** 0.762*** 0.816*** 
Hausman test for 
exogeneity of sales
x  42.90*** 56.09*** 28.34*** 37.50*** 85.34***  100.78*** 
Overidentifying restrictions 
test
xx  99.24  172.40***  77.84 97.96 88.75 97.77 
 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in brackets. Industry dummies not reported. 
           
x F-statistics and significance level reported (H0: real sales are exogenous). 
           
xx Chi2-statistics and significance level reported (H0: overidentifying restrictions not rejected). 
 
 




In Table 5 we examine the effect of firm size and the crisis period using the interactions with 
dummy variables, while industry dummies capture the effects of different industries. As a 
robustness check we repeated the estimation from columns 1 and 5 in Table 5 separately by firm 
size and by industry. The results, presented in Table A1 in the Appendix, confirm that the 
elasticities do not differ by firm size, while medium-sized firms (with 50–99 workers) have 
insignificantly lower wage elasticity than larger firms. During the crisis, the sales elasticity is 
higher for very large firms with 250 or more workers only. This does not contradict the results in 
column 6 in Table 5, where the reference group contains all firms in the pre-crisis period, while 
here the reference group covers firms of the same size group. In sum, very large firms were the 
most negatively affected by the crisis, as indicated by higher sales elasticity during the crisis.
6 
The labour demand function may also differ by industry, as the technology used for production is 
not the same across industries. Repeating the estimation in Table 5 by industry suggests that sales 
elasticity is higher in Metals than in Food. During the crisis, sales elasticity increased 
significantly in Electrical and optical machinery and in Motor vehicles, indicating that those 
export-oriented industries were hit particularly hard by the crisis.
7 
The comparison of short- and long-term elasticities in normal and crisis times is summarised in 
Table 6. In normal times (until 2007, column 1), the short-term elasticity is -0.53 with respect to 
wages and 0.43 with respect to sales. The long-term elasticities are -0.94 and 0.76 respectively. As 
expected, the long-term elasticities are higher than the short-term ones. Both the wage and sales 
elasticities increased during the crisis (column 2), but the difference is statistically significant only 
in the case of sales elasticity. The higher elasticity with respect to sales during the crisis reflects 
the fact that firms became demand constrained. The long-term elasticity with respect to wages is 
close to -1 in the periods before and during the crisis, suggesting that employment decisions are 
made by firms within fixed budgets. Similar results are obtained when the demand function is 







                                                           
6 The Hausman test confirms that real sales are endogenous in the labour demand estimation, while the 
overidentifying restrictions are not rejected (except for column 2), so our choice of instruments is valid. 
Furthermore, we also performed an AR2 test to see whether the set of instruments in levels is valid in our first 
difference dynamic model. The results of this test (not reported) reject the presence of an AR2 process. 
7 The sales elasticity is also marginally higher in Food during the crisis period. Sales are less sensitive to the 
business cycle in this particular industry, so the effect of the crisis may be more pronounced. The labour demand 
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Table 6: Employment Elasticities with Respect to Real Wages and Real Sales 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period 2002-2007 2008-2009 2002-2007 2008-2009 
Short run     
Wages -0.532***  -0.901***  -0.532***  -0.404** 
  [0.107] [0.282] [0.090] [0.161] 
Sales 0.433*** 0.664*** 0.395*** 0.553*** 
  [0.073] [0.050] [0.067] [0.066] 
Long run     
Wages -0.936***  -1.586***  -0.934***  -1.181** 
  [0.190] [0.529] [0.163] [0.518] 
Sales 0.762*** 1.168*** 0.694***  1.616** 
  [0.085] [0.189] [0.065] [0.643] 
Note:  (1)–(2) based on column 5 in Table 5; 
 (3) based on column 1 in Table 5 estimated in 2002–2007; 
 (4) based on column 1 in Table 5 estimated in 2008–2009; 
           (5)–(6) based on column 5 in Table 5, balanced sample; 
 standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
To assess changes in the demand elasticities over time, we repeat the estimation using short 
panels. The results are presented in the Appendix, where Table A2 shows estimates of the static 
model and Table A3 the dynamic model in equation (3). In each year, the elasticities are 
statistically significant, but they change from year to year. While the main results are presented 
for own workers, the inclusion of hired workers among firm employment (reported in the bottom 
parts of Tables A2 and A3) does not significantly affect the results.
8 This suggests that 
employment decisions in firms are the same regardless of whether or not hired employees are 
included, so the firm takes into account total employment. However, as third-party hired 
employees are less costly to dismiss (there are no severance payments), they are the first to go and 
their dismissal is faster than that of own employees.
9  
In Tables A4 and A5 we repeat the estimation using short panels based on the balanced dataset. 
Although the number of observations is lower, these results illustrate the changes in elasticities 
                                                           
8 In this case we assume that hired workers earn the same wage as own employees in the firm. Data on hired 
workers are only available since 2005, thus the estimates are reported since 2006 for the static specification and 
since 2007 for the dynamic one. While the wage bill used to construct the firm average wage remunerates own 
employees, firms may use other short-term employment by means of other personnel expenses. The information 
on other personnel expenses, which also includes severance payments, is available for firms with 250 or more 
employees only. We therefore repeated the estimation using the sample with 250 or more employees, where we 
included hired workers in firm employment and other personnel expenses in the average wage. We assumed that 
hired workers earn either the same wage as own employees (based on the wage bill including other personnel 
expenses) or a lower wage (calculated from the wage bill without other personnel expenses), reflecting the fact 
that severance payments are not paid to hired workers. The results are very similar for these two assumptions. 
Hence, we rely on the average wage computed using the wage bill without other personnel expenses in this 
paper. 
9 See Table 4, where the dismissal of hired workers was faster in some industries during the crisis. We also 
repeated the estimation in Table 5 for hired workers. The results suggest that the sales elasticity is higher than for 
own employees, supporting the view that hired workers are the first to go. On the other hand, the wage elasticity 
is also higher but insignificant, as we maintain the assumption that hired workers earn the same wage as own 
employees. The exact wage of hired workers is thus unmeasured but assumed to have a certain value, resulting in 
insignificant estimates. The labour function estimates for hired workers are available from the authors upon 




over time behind the results reported in Table 5, with the same firms in the sample. In particular, 
sales elasticity increased in 2009 and the rise in sales elasticity in the crisis period is more 
pronounced than in the estimates in Tables A2 and A3 based on the unbalanced sample.
10 
We also test whether real sales are exogenous using the Hausman test. The sales are exogenous in 
short panels (see the F-statistics and the significant level in Tables A2–A5), indicating that firms 
are price and demand takers in the short run.
11 However, in the long run firms affect the market, 
as illustrated by the significant F-statistics reported in Table 5. 
The next two tables summarise a comparison of our results with those reported in the literature on 
firm-level labour demand elasticities with respect to real wages (Table 7a) and sales or output 
(Table 7b) estimated for Central and Eastern European countries. Most of the estimates relate to 
the pre-transition and earlier transition periods; two studies (Domadenik and Vehovec, 2003, and 
Micevska, 2008) report estimates for the second half of the 1990s. Our study is the only one using 














                                                           
10 We also repeated the estimation from Table 5 using the balanced sample. The results (available from the 
authors upon request) support the view that the increase in sales elasticity is higher than in the case of the 
unbalanced sample, while the impact by firm size is insignificant (unlike in column 6 in Table 5) 
11 The Herfindahl index of market concentration is low and stable for most industries in 2000–2009, and 
decreasing in Motor vehicles and other transport equipment (NACE 34–35) – see Table A6. This also suggests 
that the market power of firms is low within industries and that the demand for firm output might be exogenous.   18  Jan Babecký, Kamil Galuščák and Lubomír Lízal     
 
   
Table 7a: Employment Elasticities with Respect to Real Wages – Firm-Level Estimates 
Country Estimation  period  Short-term  Long-term  Study 
Croatia  1995-2000  -0.69  -1.01  Domadenik and Vehovec (2003) 
Czech Rep.  1989–1990  -0.39  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Czech Rep.  1990–1991  insign.  -1.19  Basu et al. (2005) 
Czech Rep.  1991–1992  -0.96  insign.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Czech Rep.  1992–1993  -0.61  insign.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Czech Rep.  1992–1993, M  -0.04...-0.07  -0.07...-0.11 Singer  (1996) 
Czech Rep.  2002–2007  -0.53  -0.94  This study 
Czech Rep.  2008–2009  -0.90  -1.60  This study 
Hungary 1986–1989  -0.56  n.a. Köllõ  (1997) 
Hungary 1986–1989  -0.50…-1.41  -1.61…-1.88  Körösi  (1998) 
Hungary  1988–1989  insign.  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Hungary  1989–1990  insign.  insign.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Hungary 1989–1992  -0.17  n.a. Köllõ  (1997) 
Hungary  1990–1991  insign.  -4.76  Basu et al. (2005) 
Hungary 1990–1995  -0.44…-1.07  -1.60…-2.62  Körösi  (1998) 
Hungary  1991–1992  -0.83  -5.02  Basu et al. (2005) 
Hungary 1992–1993  -0.25  n.a. Köllõ  (1997) 
Macedonia 1994–1999  -0.43...-0.68 -1.25...-2.76  Micevska  (2008) 
Poland  1988–1989  -0.40  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Poland  1988–1989  -0.22  -0.7*  Basu et al. (1997) 
Poland  1989–1990  -0.48  -0.51  Basu et al. (2005) 
Poland  1989–1990  -0.41  -1.00*  Basu et al. (1997) 
Poland  1989–1990  -0.03  n.a.  Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) 
Poland  1990–1991  -0.57  -0.70  Basu et al. (2005) 
Poland  1992–1993  -0.29  -0.71*  Basu et al. (1997) 
Poland  1992–1994  -0.13  n.a.  Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) 
Slovak Rep.  1989–1990  -0.33  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Slovak Rep.  1990–1991  0.40  insign.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Slovak Rep.  1991–1992  -0.25  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Slovenia 1995–2000  -0.47  -0.40  Domadenik and Vehovec (2003) 
Note:    * Static (cross-sectional) estimates; insign. – estimates which are not statistically significant at 10% 
level; n.a. – not available.  











Table 7b: Employment Elasticities with Respect to Sales (Output) – Firm-Level Estimates 
Country Estimation  period  Short-term  Long-term  Study 
Croatia  1995–2000  0.43  0.94  Domadenik and Vehovec (2003) 
Czech Rep.  1989–1990  insign.  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Czech Rep.  1990–1991  0.12  0.94  Basu et al. (2005) 
Czech Rep.  1991–1992  0.59  0.94  Basu et al. (2005) 
Czech Rep.  1992–1993  0.50  0.89  Basu et al. (2005) 
Czech Rep.  1992–1993, M  0.03–0.05 0.05–0.07  Singer  (1996) 
Czech Rep.  2002–2007  0.43  0.76  This study 
Czech Rep.  2008–2009  0.66  1.17  This study 
Hungary 1986–1989  0.19  n.a. Köllõ  (1997) 
Hungary 1986–1989  0.30–0.74  0.69–1.06  Körösi  (1998) 
Hungary  1988–1989  0.60  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Hungary  1989–1990  0.24  insign.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Hungary 1989–1992  0.35  n.a. Köllõ  (1997) 
Hungary  1990–1991  0.65  0.77  Basu et al. (2005) 
Hungary 1990–1995  0.53–0.79  0.52–0.97  Körösi  (1998) 
Hungary  1991–1992  0.46  0.84  Basu et al. (2005) 
Hungary 1992–1993  0.23  n.a. Köllõ  (1997) 
Macedonia 1994–1999  0.31–0.57  0.85–1.31  Micevska  (2008) 
Poland  1988–1989  0.23  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Poland  1988–1989  0.34  0.83*  Basu et al. (1997) 
Poland  1989–1990  0.15  0.45  Basu et al. (2005) 
Poland  1989–1990  0.25  0.81*  Basu et al. (1997) 
Poland  1989–1990  0.06  n.a.  Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) 
Poland  1990–1991  0.19  0.23  Basu et al. (2005) 
Poland  1992–1993  0.23  0.72*  Basu et al. (1997) 
Poland  1992–1994  0.25  n.a.  Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) 
Slovak Rep.  1989–1990  0.10  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Slovak Rep.  1990–1991  0.06  0.97  Basu et al. (2005) 
Slovak Rep.  1991–1992  0.33  n.a.  Basu et al. (2005) 
Slovenia 1995–2000  0.54  0.86 Domadenik and Vehovec (2003) 
Note:   * Static (cross-sectional) estimates; insign. – estimates which are not statistically significant at 
10% level; n.a. – not available.  
Source: Svejnar (1999), Micevska (2008) and authors’ updates. 
 
 
Regarding the Czech Republic, there are two studies available with which we can compare our 
results, namely Singer (1996) and Basu et al. (2005). First, one can notice that all the elasticities 
reported in Singer (1996) are much lower (not exceeding 0.11 in absolute terms even for long-
term elasticities) compared not only to our estimates, but also to the estimates for other countries. 
This could be related to a unique feature of Singer’s data set – this is the only study employing 
monthly data; all the other studies listed are based on yearly data sets. Given that firms are more 
likely to follow a yearly rather than a monthly cycle in adjusting employment and wages, a 
finding of lower elasticities within a year compared to the year-to-year changes looks plausible. 
Otherwise, our estimates of short-term elasticities with respect to sales as well as wages are close 
to those reported in Basu et al. (2005). While our estimate of long-term elasticity with respect to   20  Jan Babecký, Kamil Galuščák and Lubomír Lízal     
 
   
wages is close to unity, Basu et al. (2005) find insignificant elasticity for most of the periods. On 
the other hand, the long-term elasticities with respect to sales are close to or just below unity in 
Basu et al. (2005) as well as in our paper. Overall, our results are similar to those in Basu et al. 
(2005), who found rising elasticities in the early 1990s to the levels observed in market 
economies. 
The employment elasticities reported for other Central and Eastern European countries exhibit 
some common patterns. First, the long-term elasticities are higher in absolute terms than the short-
term ones. Second, the long-term elasticities with respect to sales are close to or just below unity. 
Third, the long-term elasticities with respect to wages in a number of cases exceed unitary values, 
which indicates an overreaction of employment to real wages. Notice that such overreaction may 
be related to estimation issues (namely the difficulty of making inferences about long-term 
parameters in short panels when the parameters are changing) in combination with the role played 
by inflation expectations in the wage-setting process.  
 
5. Comparison of the Results with the Firm-Level Survey 
As a robustness check, in this section we compare our results with the stylised facts obtained from 
a CNB ad-hoc firm-level survey on wage and price setting conducted in the second half of 2007 
and in June 2009, coordinated within the ESCB Wage Dynamics Network. Although the WDN 
survey does not contain explicit information on firm-level labour demand, the survey nevertheless 
presents unique evidence on how firms respond to either hypothetical demand shocks (the 2007 
wave) or actual shocks (the 2009 wave).  
The 2007 wave of the survey contains detailed information on the determinants of wage and 
price-setting practices in Czech firms, the presence and sources of wage rigidity, and the reactions 
of firms to hypothetical shocks (see Babecký et al., 2008, for detailed information on the survey 
design and results). The survey questions largely refer to firms’ practices during the preceding 
five years, or to their expected reactions to hypothetical shocks. The survey results show that in 
response to unanticipated shocks such as a demand drop, an increase in the cost of an intermediate 
input or a wage increase, firms would mainly reduce costs by reducing non-labour costs and 
temporary employment. The adjusting role of temporary employment is what we also observe 
from Table 4 on the level of 11 industries.  
The survey was updated in June 2009 to assess firms’ responses to actual shocks and to 
investigate the main channels of the impact of the crisis on Czech firms and on wage flexibility in 
a situation of an economic downturn. The same firms were contacted in this second wave as those 
that had participated in the first wave of the survey. The results revealed that over half of the 
Czech firms surveyed had been strongly or very strongly affected by the 2008/2009 crisis in the 
form of lower demand (Hájková et al., 2009). Above-average difficulties had been experienced by 
firms in manufacturing. The survey results also indicated that nominal wage cuts had been 
extremely rare and that the frequency of nominal wage freezes had increased during the crisis of 
2008/2009. Given the rigidity in base wages, firms had extensively used alternative cost-cutting 




Table 8 shows the ways in which firms respond to an unexpected fall in demand. While the 
hypothetical reaction to an unexpected fall in demand was investigated in the 2007 questionnaire, 
firms were asked about the actual fall in demand in 2009. Among the four available adjustment 
strategies – a reduction in prices, margins, output or costs – the cost reduction strategy dominates, 
being used by about 87% of the firms surveyed in 2007 and 88% in 2009.  
 
Table 8: Firms’ Response to a Fall in Demand: Which of the Following Strategies Were    
Relevant or Very Relevant to Facing a Fall in Demand? 
  Reduce prices  Reduce margins  Reduce output  Reduce costs 
  2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 
Total  51.3 34.0 54.4 40.0 52.1 48.5 86.7 88.3 
- manufacturing  49.4  37.2  57.9 44.1 62.4 71.0 87.7 92.3 
- other industries
a)  53.5 30.3 50.4 35.2 40.0 21.5 85.6  83.9 
- small firms  38.1  28.4  44.0 28.4 33.7 39.6 90.1 84.2 
- medium firms  54.6  34.0  63.7 45.3 45.1 45.0 83.5 76.0 
- large firms  52.9  35.4  52.3  40.3  59.9  52.1 87.5 95.2 
- exporters  53.2  39.1  52.6 42.7 64.8 67.4 85.8 93.9 
-  non-exporters  50.2 31.3 55.0 38.6 46.6 38.7 87.0  85.5 
Note:   Strategies adopted during crisis (answers received in June and July 2009 – 2009 columns). 
Answers to hypothetical reaction to unexpected fall in demand as received in autumn 2007 (2007 
columns). Weighted answers in % from 241 firms with 20 or more employees. 
 
a) Other industries in business sector. Small firms with 20–49 employees, medium-sized firms 
with 50–199 employees, large firms with 200 or more employees. 
Exporters: Firms with more than half of revenue from sales of main product on foreign markets in 
2006. Statistically significant differences from reference value (manufacturing, small firms, 
exporters) at 10% in bold. 
Source: CNB ad-hoc survey. 
 
 
A reduction in costs can, in turn, be achieved via several channels, as reported in Table 9. Among 
the six channels listed, a reduction in base wages is the least frequent one. This was virtually non-
existent in 2007 (more precisely, over the five preceding years on average), and only about 4% of 
firms adopted a reduction in base wages in 2009. On the other hand, cutting flexible wage 
components to adjust costs increased from 18% in 2007 to 25% in 2009. Adjustment via the 
number of hours worked increased from 3.5% in 2007 to 12.2% in 2009. However, as the survey 
results reveal, the most important adjustment channels are reductions of employment (both 
permanent and temporary) and non-labour costs. While 19% of firms reported adjustment via 
permanent employment in 2007, the number was almost twice as high in 2009, reaching 43%. 
Cutting temporary employment rose from 27% in 2007 to 38% in 2009. One can also notice that 
in normal times adjustment via temporary employment is somewhat higher than adjustment via 
permanent employment, while during the crisis the situation is reversed. This reflects firms’ 
perceptions about the duration of the crisis: if the fall in demand is perceived as long-lasting, 
firms cut permanent workers more intensively, while in a situation of an expected temporary fall 
in demand, adjustment via temporary employment is more frequent. Lastly, the use of adjustment 
via non-labour costs increased from 42% in 2007 to 55% in 2009.    22  Jan Babecký, Kamil Galuščák and Lubomír Lízal     
 
   

















 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007  2009  2007 2009 2007  2009  2007 2009
Total 0.0  3.9  18.3  25.1  18.7  42.9 26.6 37.5  3.5  12.2 42.4 54.6 
- manufacturing  0.0  4.1  11.4  25.4  19.2 52.6 31.1 43.1 4.4  17.9 43.6 43.8 
- other industries
a) 0.0  3.7 26.0  24.7 18.2 31.9  21.6  31.1  2.5  5.7  41.0  66.9 
- small firms  0.0  2.8  23.3  17.9  17.3 27.8 26.5 29.3 0.0  2.8 54.8 49.3 
- medium firms  0.0  6.7  23.9  39.7  17.9 36.6 20.4 44.0 7.1  17.3 36.6 57.4 
- large firms  0.0  2.8  14.4  20.0  19.4 49.3 29.5 36.5 2.7  12.1 42.0 54.5 
- exporters  0.0  7.3  10.0  27.0  16.5 55.4 35.6 41.0 2.6  25.3 39.9 49.0 
- non-exporters  0.0  2.3 22.5  24.4 20.0 36.7 22.0 35.7 4.0  6.1  43.5 57.9 
Note:   See previous table 
Source: CNB ad-hoc survey. 
 
 
How do these stylised facts compare to our labour demand estimates? First, during 2008/2009 we 
find a statistically significant increase in employment elasticities with respect to sales, while 
employment elasticities with respect to real wages did not significantly increase. The increase in 
sales elasticities corresponds well to the active use of the strategies listed in Table 8, in particular 
a reduction in output and prices, and hence also sales, in the face of a fall in demand. On the other 
hand, a reduction in base wages is the least frequent adjustment channel (Table 9). In a situation 
of rigid nominal wages and decreasing inflation, real wages change by only a small margin. This 
corresponds to higher standard errors of the estimated wage elasticities in 2008/2009 and, overall, 
to an insignificant change compared to the pre-crisis period.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we presented updated firm-level labour demand elasticities in the Czech Republic in 
2002–2009. We provided new evidence of firms’ labour demand, in normal and crisis times, 
controlling for industry and firm size. Compared to the earlier estimates for the pre-1993 period 
(Basu et al., 2005), the current long-term elasticities are broadly in a range typical for a market 
economy, that is, not far from unitary values. Similar to Basu et al. (2005) and other studies 
estimating labour demand, we find that the long-term elasticities are higher than the short-term 
ones.  
Our results corroborate the findings of the survey on wage and price formation of Czech firms 
conducted in 2007 and 2009. In particular, the effect of the 2008/2009 global crisis was seen in 
the Czech Republic chiefly as a fall in external demand. Consequently, the fall in demand 
obviously affected firms’ demand for labour. In a situation of prevailing wage rigidities (both 
nominal and real), the bulk of the adjustment occurred via a reduction in prices, margins, output 




permanent and temporary), hours of work and non-labour costs. Of particular interest is that the 
estimated employment elasticities with respect to sales increased in 2008–2009, reflecting large 
adjustment to employment and sales, while the employment elasticities with respect to real wages 
did not change in a statistically significant manner, arguably due to limited variation in wages 
during the crisis. 
We also assessed the sensitivity of the results with respect to the type of workers (own versus 
hired) and the type of remuneration (wages only or wages plus other personnel expenses) as well 
as over time (by estimating labour demand in short panels). First, we find that the inclusion of 
workers hired through temporary work agencies does not significantly affect the results, 
indicating that firms take into account total labour when deciding on employment. The dismissal 
of hired workers is faster than that of own employees, as hired workers are less costly to dismiss 
due to the absence of severance payments. Similarly, the inclusion of other personnel expenses 
(related to short-term employment) has no significant effect on the estimated demand elasticities. 
Finally, the estimation of labour demand using short panels confirms an increase in employment 
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Appendix: Additional Results 
Table A1: Labour Demand Estimates by Firm Size, 2002–2009 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  size (50–99)  size (100–249)  size (250+) 
∆Log  labour  (-1)  0.3662** 0.3807** 0.3968*** 0.4584*** 0.4477*** 0.5258*** 
 [0.1648]  [0.1677]  [0.0602]  [0.0789] [0.0831] [0.0896] 
∆Log  wage  -0.6725***  -0.6653*** -0.4854*** -0.3878*** -0.4487*** -0.4825*** 
 [0.1861]  [0.2049]  [0.1100]  [0.1280] [0.1277] [0.1600] 
∆Log  sales  0.4700***  0.4544*** 0.5211*** 0.4518*** 0.4901*** 0.3259*** 
 [0.0700]  [0.0896]  [0.0420]  [0.0858] [0.0674] [0.0838] 
∆Log  wage*period08/09    -0.2147  -0.3047  0.0882 
    [0.4487]  [0.2815]  [0.2675] 
∆Log sales*period08/09    0.259    0.1317    0.3767*** 
    [0.1662]  [0.1097]  [0.1105] 
N  2322  2322 5969 5969 4233 4233 
Long-run wage 
elasticity 
-1.061***  -1.074*** -0.805*** -0.716*** -0.812*** -1.018*** 
Long-run sales 
elasticity 
0.742***  0.734*** 0.864*** 0.834*** 0.887*** 0.687*** 
Note: Based on columns (1) and (5) in Table 5. 
          Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Industry dummies not reported. 
 
 
Table A2: Estimation Results Using Short Panels
a) – Basic Specification 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Own workers 
∆Log wage  -0.4783*** -0.5176***  -0.6124*** -0.3819** -0.9952*** -0.5042*** -0.6044*** -0.4603***
  [0.1231] [0.1182] [0.1400] [0.1584] [0.2319] [0.1544] [0.1302] [0.1699] 
∆Log  sales  0.4442*** 0.4257*** 0.4196*** 0.3855*** 0.3136*** 0.3262*** 0.4493*** 0.5134*** 
  [0.0570] [0.0633] [0.0566] [0.0980] [0.1040] [0.0890] [0.0964] [0.0540] 
N  1660 1816 2095 1558 1433 1356 1277 1329 
Haus.  test  0.92 2.57 0.52 0.39 0.44 0.62 0.73 2.72* 
Own and hired workers 
∆Log  wage      -0.9749*** -0.4721***  -0.6326*** -0.4974***
       [0.2400]  [0.1665]  [0.1361]  [0.1712] 
∆Log  sales       0.3152***  0.3380***  0.4582***  0.5152*** 
       [0.1044]  [0.0836]  [0.0966]  [0.0535] 
N       1433  1356  1277  1329 
Haus.  test       0.68  0.65  0.51  1.09 
Note: 
a) For each year listed in the table, observations from the current and two previous years are used to 
produce the estimations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in brackets. Industry 
dummies not reported. Hausman test for exogeneity of sales (H0: real sales are exogenous, F 
statistics reported).  
 




Table A3: Estimation Results Using Short Panels – Dynamic Specification 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Own workers 
∆Log labour 
(-1) 0.1282**  0.4212***  0.1578  0.1575**  0.5240*** 0.5155*** 0.4628*** 0.4087*** 
  [0.0605] [0.1234] [0.1058] [0.0769] [0.0804] [0.0834] [0.1338] [0.1448] 
∆Log wage  -0.5157*** -0.5525***  -0.5874*** -0.4858*** -0.9173*** -0.3539** -0.5369*** -0.4914***
  [0.1227] [0.1249] [0.1346] [0.1590] [0.2076] [0.1397] [0.1342] [0.1622] 
∆Log  sales  0.4142*** 0.3535*** 0.3849*** 0.3869*** 0.2360*** 0.2650*** 0.3905*** 0.4681*** 
  [0.0597] [0.0631] [0.0650] [0.1045] [0.0807] [0.0796] [0.1050] [0.0582] 
N  1660 1816 2095 1558 1433 1356 1277 1329 
LR  wage  el. -0.592*** -0.955*** -0.697*** -0.577*** -1.927***  -0.73**  -0.999*** -0.831*** 
LR sales el.  0.475***  0.611***  0.457***  0.459*** 0.496*** 0.547*** 0.727*** 0.792*** 
Haus.  test  0.25 1.07 0.22 0.51 0.74 1.10 0.48 1.46 
Own and hired workers 
∆Log labour 
(-1)        0.4940***  0.3649**  0.3457** 
        [0.0805]  [0.1824]  [0.1416] 
∆Log  wage        -0.3597**  -0.5790*** -0.5286***
        [0.1565]  [0.1462]  [0.1628] 
∆Log  sales        0.2726***  0.4119***  0.4781*** 
        [0.0753]  [0.1075]  [0.0573] 
N        1356  1277  1329 
LR  wage  el.        -0.711**  -0.912***  -0.808*** 
LR  sales  el.        0.539***  0.649***  0.731*** 
Haus.  test        1.19  0.34  0.46 
Note: See Table A2. 
 
 
Table A4: Estimation Results Using Short Panels, Balanced Sample – Basic Specification 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Own workers 
∆Log wage  -0.2968*** -0.4631***  -0.6078*** -0.4272*** -0.6889*** -0.3810** -0.4180*** -0.6416***
  [0.1096] [0.1614] [0.1293] [0.1630] [0.1553] [0.1545] [0.1432] [0.1764] 
∆Log  sales  0.3861*** 0.4272*** 0.3871*** 0.3482*** 0.2378*** 0.2370*** 0.2831*** 0.5430*** 
  [0.0611] [0.0920] [0.0678] [0.0538] [0.0685] [0.0648] [0.0590] [0.0928] 
N  700 770 876 857 876 874 843 839 
Haus. test  0.87  3.58*  0.04 1.77 0.04 0.10 0.07 2.49 
Own and hired workers 
∆Log  wage      -0.6528*** -0.3840*  -0.4405*** -0.6404***
       [0.1852]  [0.2106]  [0.1535]  [0.1790] 
∆Log  sales       0.2386***  0.2404***  0.3311***  0.5513*** 
       [0.0694]  [0.0676]  [0.0619]  [0.0921] 
N       876  874  843  839 
Haus.  test       0.26  0.01  0.07  1.58 
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Table A5: Estimation Results Using Short Panels, Balanced Sample – Dynamic Specification 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Own workers 
∆Log labour 
(-1)  0.2427***  0.3795*** 0.1055 0.2437*** 0.4183*** 0.4357***  0.2876  0.3747*** 
  [0.0580] [0.0871] [0.0857] [0.0764] [0.0860] [0.0985] [0.2095] [0.1038] 
∆Log wage  -0.3145*** -0.5264***  -0.5824*** -0.4443*** -0.6500*** -0.2045 -0.4306*** -0.5863***
  [0.1087] [0.1534] [0.1257] [0.1511] [0.1483] [0.1418] [0.1437] [0.1717] 
∆Log  sales  0.3806*** 0.3587*** 0.3521*** 0.2756*** 0.1953*** 0.2068*** 0.2548*** 0.4861*** 
  [0.0611] [0.0910] [0.0750] [0.0608] [0.0590] [0.0583] [0.0608] [0.0915] 
N  700 770 876 857 876 874 843 839 
LR  wage  el. -0.415*** -0.848*** -0.651*** -0.587***  -1.117*** -0.362 -0.604***  -0.938*** 
LR sales el.  0.503***  0.578***  0.394***  0.364*** 0.336*** 0.367*** 0.358*** 0.777*** 
Haus.  test  1.64 1.51 0.09 0.34 0.15 0.04 0.26 0.98 
Own and hired workers 
∆Log labour 
(-1)        0.4141***  0.0934  0.2985*** 
        [0.0858]  [0.2823]  [0.1019] 
∆Log  wage        -0.2528  -0.4501*** -0.6021***
        [0.2153]  [0.1451]  [0.1751] 
∆Log  sales        0.2179***  0.3209***  0.5026*** 
        [0.0602]  [0.0679]  [0.0919] 
N        874  843  839 
LR  wage  el.        -0.431  -0.496***  -0.858*** 
LR  sales  el.        0.372***  0.354***  0.717*** 
Haus.  test        0.00  0.03  0.44 
Note: See Table A2. 
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Note: Sum of squared market share of each firm in industry (based on sales; firms with 20 or more 
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